At cross-purposes: commercial versus technocratic governance of sovereign debt in the EU by Barta, Zsofia & Schelkle, Waltraud
  
Zsofia Barta and Waltraud Schekle  
At cross-purposes: commercial versus 
technocratic governance of sovereign debt 
in the EU 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Barta, Zsofia and Schelkle, Waltraud (2015) At cross-purposes: commercial versus technocratic 
governance of sovereign debt in the EU. Journal of European Integration. pp. 1-20. ISSN 0703-
6337 (In Press)  
 
© 2015 Taylor & Francis 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/61667/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: April 2015 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
1 
 
At Cross-Purposes: Commercial Versus Technocratic 
Governance of Sovereign Debt in the EU 
ZSOFIA BARTA* AND WALTRAUD SCHELKLE** 
* Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy, State University of New York, 
Albany, USA 
** European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 
UK 
 
ABSTRACT: The governance of EMU was premised on the idea that market 
discipline, informed by fiscal surveillance, supports the building of a hard currency 
union. Theory would lead us to expect that the international-commercial and the 
supranational-technocratic assessments of sovereign debt are fairly aligned.  But they 
were not. We show that credit rating agencies (CRAs) and Eurostat have rather 
different assessments of what certain policies mean for sovereign debt. These 
assessments reveal divergent institutional logics of market actors and regulators. 
Private agencies are prone to conformism and herding behavior, allowing for little 
consistent discipline, while the public agency follows a bureaucratic imperative of 
accountability and transparency, which gets in the way of evolving policy priorities. 
Our findings thus shed light on the difficulties of fiscal governance by regulation only 
but they also suggest that reforms at the EMU level do not provide quick fixes.  
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EU Fiscal Governance and the Lack of Support by Market Discipline 
The articles in this special issue identify the most important institutional shortcomings 
and design flaws of EMU and provide plenty of ideas on how they could be amended. 
Giavazzi and Wyplosz, for instance, set off with a systematic and honest assessment 
of whether a similar analysis in 1998 stood the test of time; De Grauwe and Ji and 
Begg et al discuss more recent lessons from the crisis. While there is no complete 
agreement, nobody proposes that EMU governance should leave more room for 
market discipline. How times change. 
Fiscal surveillance in the euro area was premised on the idea that if it would 
signal the right information to market observers, their reactions would support the 
building of a hard currency union. Already the Maastricht convergence criteria invited 
market forces to sit on the judging panel to decide who was ‘fit’ for EMU: 
convergence of interest and inflation rates could not be simply manipulated by 
authorities. Yet, far from disciplining budgetary policies, capital flows financed 
deficits at historically low interest rates. It is safe to assume that the EU’s fiscal rules 
could have been more easily enforced if financial market actors had supported the 
Commission’s fiscal surveillance and, for instance, credit rating agencies (CRAs) had 
downgraded the bonds of offending member states reliably and investors imposed 
rising risk premia accordingly.  
Some economists warned of the lack of market discipline (Faini 2006; Jones). 
They could point to the convergence of government bond spreads of member states 
despite different or deteriorating fiscal positions. Yet, those who believed in market 
discipline could point out that this might be due to diminishing exchange rate risks, 
leaving only liquidity and default risks to price (Manganelli and Wolswijk 2007: 10-
11, 24-25). The empirical evidence before the 2007-08 crisis suggested that bond 
spreads reflected different ratings but the methodology used could obviously not 
quantify whether the pricing was correct. Moreover, expansionary fiscal policy by a 
member state seemed to spillover into the average level of interest rates, suggesting 
that fiscal rules were needed additionally to prevent this externality (Faini 2006: 464, 
469). The regulation of credit ratings was briefly discussed in Europe after the Asian 
crisis and the Enron scandal but was resisted by international business and banks 
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which depended for their investments and also their own ratings on a sovereign 
benchmark (Abdelal 2007: 175).  
The lack of support for EU surveillance from CRAs should come as a surprise 
even to those who do not believe that efficiency is an inherent feature of financial 
markets. After all, sovereign credit rating is a multi-billion dollar business, dominated 
by three agencies (Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s) that constantly provide 
information to markets about the credit risk of government bond issues. By mid-2010, 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) rated 125 governments, the other two over a 100 each (IMF 
2010: 87). This makes reputation for accurate ratings extremely valuable. Moreover, 
there should also have been incentives for the monitoring of these monitors. Credit 
ratings were built into the regulation of financial institutions, in that the risk-weights 
of the assets could be based on such credit ratings and thus determine the capital 
requirements under Basel II (IMF2010: 91-92). Since highly rated bonds of OECD 
countries carried a zero risk weight and were therefore very attractive to meet capital 
requirements, it should at the same time have given independent financial regulators 
considerable incentive to make sure that the ratings of government bonds signaled 
problems of fiscal sustainability accurately. Last but not least, the European Central 
Bank (ECB), like other central banks, used these credit ratings in refinancing 
operations: in return for central bank credit, banks had to put up collateral that met a 
certain credit rating standard in order to be acceptable to the ECB. In sum, both 
financial and institutional incentives for reputation of commercial and technocratic 
monitors of public finances should have been aligned.  
These considerations can be supported by at least two conceptualizations of 
the European integration project. There is, first, the interpretation of the EU as a 
regulatory polity that suggests that it constitutes a ‘fourth branch of government’ for 
supranational economic regulation (Majone 1993, 1996). This theory seeks to explain 
why sovereign governments delegated considerable regulatory powers to independent 
bodies, such as the Commission or the ECB. In this view, delegation of policymaking 
powers guards against well-known failures of democracy to either represent the 
majority or to consider the legitimate interests of outsiders of national democratic 
processes, be it foreigners or future generations. In the medium to long run, these 
failures impoverish countries and the interdependence of economies makes national 
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democratic failure a problem for other countries. Hence, governments agree on 
supranational institutions as restraint on destabilizing macroeconomic policies.  The 
analogy of the regulatory polity and the institutionalization of CRAs as regulators is 
striking: governments, not only in Europe but internationally, gave self-regulatory 
authority to financial markets they had liberalized and the markets ceased some of 
their power to the agencies (Abdelal 2007: 165). Far from privatizing regulatory 
authority, CRAs seemed to fit into an innovative approach of non-politicized 
regulation of global markets in which sovereigns could not claim privileges.  
At the opposite end of this functionalist view of EU policymaking is a 
constructivist interpretation that sees European economic integration as putting into 
practice neo- or ordoliberal ideas. This followed the perceived German success story 
at a time when Keynesian interventions seemed to fail (McNamara 1998). A 
singularly independent central bank and fiscal rules were introduced to tie 
governments’ hands. The recent failure of financial markets on a colossal scale did 
not end the neoliberal reign, on the contrary, an ‘austerity delusion’ has taken hold of 
EU policymakers that is manifestly counterproductive for economic recovery (Blyth 
2013: ch.3). In this view, the fiscal surveillance process can be seen as directly 
feeding financial investors with data, inviting them to sanction government behavior 
that would prioritize domestic redistribution and stimulus over the repayment of 
bonds. The role of credit ratings in the Basel II framework of financial regulation is 
further evidence for a close alignment of business interests and neoliberal ideas of 
government. CRAs invented “a common language of credit risk” and governments 
proceeded to make “the bond market’s private authority public” (Abdelal 2007: 174).  
The empirical corollary of these theories is that the international-commercial 
assessments of sovereign creditworthiness and the supranational-technocratic 
surveillance of budgets should be fairly aligned. Prospective bond buyers had in the 
Commission a potential ally and the regulatory/ neoliberal polity in fiscal policy 
should have directly fed into the assessment of sovereign creditworthiness by rating 
agencies. The commercial agencies’ interest in the probability of sovereign default 
can be seen as a specification of the EU’s interest in externalities of public debt 
accumulation, such as higher interest rates and inflationary pressures.  
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For our study of rating agency behavior, we concentrate on Standard and 
Poor’s, which is the most active and influential agency in sovereign credit rating (de 
Haan and Amtenbrink 2011: 5, 9). We rely both on publicly available data by 
analyzing the content of Rating Methodologies and individual rating reports for 
individual countries issued by S&P and on interview evidence.
1
 For the study of 
technocratic fiscal surveillance, we analyze the ways in which Eurostat’s statistical 
accounting translates data on pension savings and banking rescues into information 
about fiscal sustainability. So we turn the theoretical puzzle into the empirically 
researchable question: why do market actors and a supranational economic 
bureaucracy have different assessments of these government interventions? 
We have chosen pension reforms and bank rescue programs because they have 
strong fiscal consequences in contrast to, for instance, cuts in unemployment 
benefits.
2
 They also have sufficiently rich and complex budgetary effects so that their 
assessment is a non-trivial task. Their long-term effects can be different from the 
short-term. Pensions have been a construction site of reforms over several decades 
now, while systemic bank rescues in developed countries took government watchers 
by surprise. This allows us to see how commercial and technocratic monitoring of 
sovereign debt interpret complex data and construct information about fiscal 
sustainability or sovereign creditworthiness, respectively.  
                                                          
1
 The textual evidence is based on 267 country reports between 1999 and 2012 and four different 
editions of rating methodologies (2006, 2008, 2011 and 2013). The content of all of these documents 
were systematically analysed using the Nvivo software. Reports specifically referenced in this text are 
specified by country acronym and publication date. The interview evidence is drawn from a telephone 
interview conducted in November 2013 with one of S&P’s four primary analysts in the sovereign 
rating group. 
2 An earlier version looked at the privatization of state-owned enterprises, left out for reasons of space. 
We found that despite the general agreement between EU authorities and S&P about the desirability of 
privatization in principle, the tangible incentives that the supranational and commercial channels of 
surveillance provide are quite different. European statistical rules encourage privatization to reduce 
current debt, thus allowing governments to prettify their fiscal performance. But Eurostat has also been 
at pains to ensure that some of the hidden losses entailed in the sale of government assets are recorded 
transparently (Savage 2005: 81-89) . S&P on the other hand, did not acknowledge costs of 
privatization. Apart from the occasional warning that one-off measures to decrease the deficit should 
be greeted with caution, the reports do not take into consideration that privatization deals may be 
myopic and reduce future revenues.  
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The next three sections analyze the rating and statistical accounting of the two 
policy measures as well as recent changes to the approach of CRAs and to fiscal 
surveillance in the wake of the economic and financial crisis. In the section before the 
conclusions, we discuss our findings and we try to answer the overall question of why 
EU fiscal governance by regulation only is so unsatisfactory, both from the point of 
view of those who are concerned about high debt and those who are concerned about 
constraints on fiscal stimulus. Our conclusions argue that markets and distributional 
conflicts can overstretch governments’ capacity to control their budgets.   
 
Pension Reforms 
The increasing pension liabilities of governments have bothered EU fiscal 
surveillance for some time. Member states must provide estimates of the evolution of 
age-related contingent liabilities over a rolling 50-year horizon in their annual 
stability programs. There are dedicated publications, such as the tri-annual Ageing 
Reports and the Fiscal Sustainability Reports, in which the European Commission 
regularly quantifies the effects of ageing on the ratios of workers to pensioners, on 
government expenditure and on debt. In the country-specific recommendations issued 
under the European Semester, the Commission urges pension reform, notably 
increasing the retirement age, reducing public pension entitlements and introducing 
mandatory personal pensions, in more than half of the member states (SPC 2008).  
However, despite these revealed concerns about the demographic drivers of 
sovereign debt, the statistical accounting for pensions has not managed to incorporate 
the issue in a way that provides incentives for the recommended pension reforms. 
Eurostat is quite explicit about the difficulties to account consistently for the various 
tiers or pillars of old age security. The ‘Manual on Government Deficit and Debt’ 
notes, with an undertone of regret, that there is an inconsistency in the accounting 
between pension obligations from funded and from unfunded schemes (Eurostat 
2013: 144): the obligations under the latter obligations are not counted as debt and 
become visible only as they arise in future expenditure.  
One consequence of these accounting rules is that pension liabilities can be 
made to disappear by transferring them from a funded occupational scheme to a 
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public pay-as-you-go scheme. This is a live issue in the ‘cleaning out’ of state-owned 
enterprises before privatization (Eurostat 2013: 142), namely to assume debt or 
obligations that could scare off prospective investors. The clean-out typically requires 
a one-off payment from the company as compensation for the government taking over 
all or part of the liabilities. Pensions for employees are typically the most relevant 
issue. Debt assumption and the one-off payment could be timed such that it helps the 
government to enhance its budget balance at a convenient moment. Eurostat (2013: 
142-143) accepts the lump sum payment to the government as deficit-decreasing 
revenue. This revenue will be offset by future payments of pensions that increase the 
deficit. However, if the lump-sum or one-off payment does not match the actuarial 
value of the obligations, the difference must be recorded as a deficit-increasing capital 
transfer if the lump sum is too low while it must be recorded as a deficit-neutral 
‘withdrawal of equity’ (switch of public asset composition) if it is too high (Eurostat 
2013: 143). This asymmetry means that the accounting rule penalizes debt assumption 
by government but does not reward implicit taxation of investors in privatization.  
Thus, rather than shifting from public unfunded to private or collective funded 
schemes, there are incentives to move in the opposite direction. In this European 
accounting sense, the move to a funded public pension pillar is therefore not made 
attractive for any administration currently in power. 
The commercial rating of pension liabilities shows other signs of 
inconsistency. The stance of S&P on pension reforms evolved in a curious fashion 
over time. In its rating methodologies issued in 2006 and 2008, S&P emphatically 
warned of the risks to fiscal sustainability that ageing would bring and warned that 
sovereigns that fail to address age-related spending pressures might be downgraded in 
the medium term (S&P 2006: 10; S&P 2008). Country-specific rating reports also 
repeatedly brought up the issue of the risk of age-related spending increases. Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany and Italy were frequently urged to address their 
vulnerabilities in this regard
3
. In other countries, the absence of rising pension 
liabilities was stressed as a factor that lead to stronger ratings. Favorable 
                                                          
3
 S&P Au2000June13, Au2003May21, Be1999Feb1, Be2002Feb18, Be2003Mar18, Be2004Jan23, 
Fr2001Jan24, Fr2002Jan28, Fr2003Mar19, Fr2004Jan20, Fr2006Feb28, Ge2002Dec10, Ge2003May6, 
Ge2005Mar1, Ge2005Nov16, Ge2006Dec19, It1999May27, It2000Apr19, It2001Oct26, It2003Jan15, 
It2006Oct19 
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demographics and prefunding were mentioned as important strengths in Ireland, a 
fully funded and sizeable second tier propped up ratings for Denmark, whereas the 
UK was commended for its largely private pension provision
4
. Since the start of the 
crisis, however, S&P has put much less emphasis on pension reforms. Compared to 
the alarmist tone in earlier methodologies, the revised methodologies issued in 2011 
and 2013 explicitly downplay the aging-related risks to sovereign creditworthiness 
and emphasize that in many cases there is still sufficient time to address these issues 
(S&P 2011: 26 and S&P 2013: 26). In line with this change of methodologies, the 
individual country reports have become mostly oblivious of the issue of ageing and of 
pension reforms. 
In sum, commercial rating and supranational surveillance go into opposite 
directions as regards their assessment of reducing public pensions. Eurostat flags up 
the issue but consistency of statistical rules prevents it from accounting for the 
contingent pension liabilities in public budgets in the headline fiscal indicators, the 
debt- and deficit-to-GDP ratios. As indicated, fiscal surveillance has found other 
venues, such as the European Semester and the regular stability programs, to drive 
home the message. S&P issued warnings that it would initiate downgrades if a 
government failed to deal with age-related expenditures but hardly ever acted on it. 
More recently, this CRA has backtracked on pension reforms considerably. There is 
certainly no alignment in this policy area.  
 
Crisis Management: Economic Stabilization and Bank Rescues 
The financial and economic crisis since 2007-08 forced governments to temporarily 
set aside fiscal rigor in an effort to prop up their ailing economies with stimulus 
measures. It also pushed governments into bank rescues on a truly astounding scale, 
for fear that otherwise the banks’ struggle for survival would bring down the economy 
and inflict unacceptable social disruption on core constituencies. Governments 
guaranteed banks’ liabilities, took over their bad assets or temporarily nationalized 
                                                          
4
 S&P Dk2001Feb27, Dk2002Mar26, Dk2003Apr9, Dk2004Aug26, Dk2005Sep30, Dk2006Sep25, 
Dk2007Sep26, Ir1999Aug13, Ir2000Oct3, Ir2001Oct3, Ir2002Sep5, Ir2003Oct30, Ir2004Dec23, 
Ir2005Dec20, Ir2006Dec21, Ir2007Nov23, UK2003June24 
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insolvent financial institutions. How much leeway do the two forms of fiscal 
monitoring provide to governments in these testing times?  
EU fiscal rules that guide surveillance arguably prioritize prudent public 
finances over the stabilization of the economy; the accounting principles to generate 
the underlying information are designed accordingly. As far as bank rescues are 
concerned, Eurostat put out extensive communications since the start of the financial 
crisis to clarify the rules and made decisions on the treatment of ‘financial defeasance 
structures’, as bad banks are called in official language. These ensure that costs 
incurred and liabilities assumed by governments cannot be kept off the books unless 
there is a very strong chance that they either will not materialize or that they can be 
turned into profitable investment in the future. The most important principles 
distinguish the various rescue measures. Capital injections in ‘too big to fail’ entities 
are grants that are deficit-increasing (Eurostat 2013: 112, 120). By contrast, 
government guarantees of a bank’s liabilities, notably savings deposits, affect neither 
debt nor deficit and only once the guarantee is called, does it increase the deficit 
(Eurostat 2013: 188, para 33). If the guarantee keeps a unit alive that is not really 
active in markets any more, Eurostat (2013: 188) puts down criteria for financial 
defeasance that national accountants can use to establish whether it has actually 
turned into a vehicle to wind down some of the former business. This is the case for 
instance, if the guaranteed bank is closed to new deposit taking or lending. In other 
words, only guarantees that do not meet the criteria for financial defeasance are below 
the line of relevant fiscal items in the Commission’s surveillance.  
Furthermore, the transfer of bank assets and liabilities is subject to asymmetric 
valuation principles. If a bank or some of its assets and liabilities become part of a 
defeasance structure, the difference between the transfer value of the assets and the 
market or fair value is a capital transfer to the debtors (banks) of the defeasance 
structure that increases the deficit (Eurostat 2013: 183-186). In a crisis, this difference 
and hence the effect on government deficits are likely to be overstated because market 
or fair values tend to be unduly low in distressed markets. Revaluation of the assets 
later, for instance due to rising prices for real estate, are not taken into account for the 
net lending or borrowing of the government (Eurostat 2013: 184, para 19; 185, para 
21; 187, para 30). The assets and liabilities of a bad bank also come on the 
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government books, hence (gross) debt of general government increases. These 
accounting rules generate considerable penalty for bank rescue measures in the 
European system of fiscal surveillance. 
S&P’s approach creates even greater difficulties for governments in trying to 
deal with economic and financial crises. Since the start of the crisis S&P has 
aggressively downgraded previously high-rated countries – like Ireland and Spain – 
for disappointing growth prospects and for assuming large liabilities in bailing out 
troubled banks. The current heavy-handed response stands in marked contrast with 
the leniency exercised before the crisis. From the mid-2000s, S&P had voiced 
concerns about an overheating economy (Ireland), excessive private sector 
indebtedness (Ireland and the UK), bubbles on the real estate markets and the 
possibility of sharp corrections (Ireland, Spain and the UK)
5
. Although all of these 
factors foreshadowed problems with growth and the banking sector, the agency did 
not consider a downgrade or even a negative creditwatch back then. Since the start of 
the crisis, however, rating methodologies have been updated to put more emphasis on 
growth prospects and the stability of the banking sector. 
S&P downgraded governments for bank rescues irrespective of whether they 
took the form of guarantees, capital injections or nationalizations. For example, 
Ireland – which still received a clean bill of health as late as November 20076 – was 
issued a negative outlook in January 2009 after its government issued guarantees to 
seven national banks. It was then downgraded six times in the following three years as 
the massive costs of those guarantees materialized
7
. Importantly, once the scope of 
the banking crisis became clear, S&P did not restrict itself to rate explicit government 
measures but sought to provide forward-looking evaluations by carrying out in-house 
modeling of the further costs of saving banks
8
. In none of the successive rating reports 
                                                          
5 
S&P Ir2004Dec23, Ir2005Dec29, Ir2006Dec21, Ir2007Nov23, Sp2004Dec13, Sp2005Nov28, 
Sp2006Nov28, Sp2007Nov26, UK2005Mar31, UK2006Nov10 
6
 The 2007 November credit report contended that ‘Ireland's extremely strong [AAA] credit standing 
should remain secure against most foreseeable downside economic, political, and financial risks’ (S&P 
Ir2007Nov13: 3). 
7 
S&P Ir2009Mar30, Ir2009June8, Ir2010Aug24, 2010Nov23, Ir2011Feb2, Ir2011Apr1
 
8
 Examples of the type of independent assessment of the costs of banking crisis can be found in the 
March 2009 and the April 2010 rating reports on Ireland (S&P Ir2009Mar30:2-3 and Ir2010Apr8: 2-3). 
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was there allowance for the beneficial effect bank rescues might have for the health of 
the banking sector and the economy in the longer term. Spain’s experience was 
similar. On three occasions, downgrades were prompted by S&P’s progressively 
worsening forecasts of the likely costs of government involvement in saving the 
banking sector (S&P Sp2010Apr28, Sp2011Dec5, Sp2012Apr26). Efforts to restore a 
viable banking industry came into consideration only as a downside risk for public 
finances. 
In sum, the two systems of surveillance also display considerable differences. 
The SGP has an escape clause to allow for suspending fiscal rules in times of 
recession, although the Commission and the Council opted for not using it. In the 
handling of bank rescues, Eurostat aims at maximum accounting accuracy and 
transparency by differentiating between the different instruments governments use for 
bank rescues and by only recording the actual costs of a transaction once financial 
defeasance materializes. By contrast, S&P assesses bank rescues indiscriminately 
(negatively), and it has sought to adopt a proactive approach by penalizing 
government involvement in the troubles of the banking sector even before the costs of 
government intervention can be known with a reasonable degree of certainty. For 
S&P, weak growth is a main reason for downgrading countries.   
 
Changes in Fiscal Monitoring in the Wake of the Crisis 
Our comparison between fiscal surveillance by a deliberately technocratic body and 
credit rating by a commercial agency shows noticeable differences between the two 
ways of fiscal monitoring. The recent responses to the crisis by Eurostat, on the one 
hand, and by S&P, on the other, confirm and reinforce this finding. While Eurostat 
has sought to emphasize the continuity of the principles of the European System of 
Statistics, S&P has gone out of its way to demonstrate that it has incorporated into its 
methodologies and assessments the most important lessons of the crisis.  
Although Eurostat naturally had to respond to new issues as a result of the 
crisis, it sought to address these issues emphatically through the continuation, or 
‘clarification’, of existing principles. For example, when it upgraded its Manual on 
Government Deficit and Debt in 2013, only one of the three new chapters related to 
12 
 
the crisis. This chapter dealt with new ‘European entities related to the Euro Area 
sovereign debt crisis’, i.e. the emergency fund, the European Stability Mechanism 
with its predecessor EFSF, which provide credit to governments under attack in bond 
markets. All other issues raised by the crisis, like financial defeasance or the capital 
injections on an unprecedented scale in the case of Ireland, did not make Eurostat 
invent new accounting devices but issue ‘clarifications’. There are no significant 
changes to the recording of the other two policy areas analyzed above, pensions and 
privatizations.  
Eurostat also stresses the consensual character of its decisions concerning 
issues emerging from the crisis. The new Manual refers to wide-ranging consultations 
on the clarifications and refinements of existing principles: ‘It is the result of a 
collective work, co-ordinated and animated by Eurostat, by experts in Government 
Financial Statistics and national accounts representing EU Member States, the 
Commission (the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs) and the 
European Central Bank.’ (Eurostat 2013: 1) The attempt to uphold continuity and 
transparency in the European System of Statistics is based on a conspicuous 
consensus among national and international experts, thus fending off criticism and 
interventions by some Treasuries. 
By contrast, S&P has emphasized change, adaptation to shifting conditions 
and the incorporation of new lessons into assessments of creditworthiness. Since the 
start of the crisis, S&P issued three new methodologies, in 2008, 2011 and 2013. 
These successive iterations of methodologies integrate new issues and discuss old 
ones in more detail than before. All three policy areas discussed above have been 
subject to considerable revisions. The urgency of pension reform is now explicitly 
downplayed, as already indicated (S&P 2011: 26 and 2013:26).  Privatization and 
structural reform also receive much less emphasis. Accordingly, these issues literally 
disappear from individual country reports. Contingent liabilities generated by an 
unstable banking sector are discussed in much greater detail than before (S&P 2011: 
28-30 and 2013: 28-30). Growth prospects also become a central issue and a long 
section is dedicated to explaining how they are assessed (S&P 2011: 17-18 and 
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2013:17-18)
9
. These new issues affected the ratings of a host of countries besides 
Ireland and Spain. Growth concerns led to falling ratings in Greece, Italy and 
Portugal, whereas problems with the banking sector contributed to downgrades of 
Belgium and potential banking problems cost Austria its AAA rating
10
.  An important 
new issue in focus is crisis management or, more specifically, the ability of 
governments to respond to economic and financial shocks (S&P 2011: 13 and 
2013:13). Finally, the constraints on policy adjustment in countries that are members 
of monetary unions are mentioned for the first time in the two newest methodologies 
(S&P 2011: 34-35 and 2013: 34-35). The new focus on the latter two issues motivated 
an unprecedented collective rating report issued in January 2012, which 
simultaneously reviewed existing ratings for all euro-members in response to what 
was seen as weak crisis management at the European level, by the Commission and 
the ECB
11
.  
The reforms in rating methodologies and profound changes in the rating 
approach indicate that credit ratings do not have a consistent methodological basis to 
make them usable for regulatory purposes. Instead, ratings focus on current issues that 
are of most interest to market investors at any given moment. This explains both why 
S&P placed such emphasis on privatizations and pension reforms before the crisis, 
even though these issues have only a tenuous relationship to the probability of 
sovereign debt default, and why it was so willing to disregard these issues once the 
crisis threw up others. This approach stands in marked contrast with Eurostat’s 
insistence on maintaining continuity and consistency despite the extraordinary times. 
 
                                                          
9
 Interestingly, the new methodologies explicitly promise to avoid the mistake that S&P committed 
when not acting upon asset-bubbles and credit fuelled growth in Spain and Ireland before the crisis: “A 
sovereign's economic score would be one category worse than the initial score, when GDP growth 
seems to be fueled mostly by a rapid increase in banking sector domestic claims on the private sector, 
combined with a sustained growth in inflation-adjusted asset prices, indicating vulnerability to a 
potential credit-fueled asset bubble.” (S&P 2011:17, a similar paragraph can be found in S&P 2013:16) 
10
 S&P Au2012Jan13, Be2011Nov25, Gr2010Apr27, Gr2012May2, It2011Sep19, Pt2010Apr27 
11
 In this collective rating action, nine sovereigns were downgraded, whereas the ratings of seven others 
were affirmed (S&P 2012). 
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Two Different Logics 
Our take on these findings is that they support neither the regulatory polity 
interpretation, which sees the EU as a fourth branch of government for supranational 
economic regulation, nor the neoliberal project view, which construes EU fiscal 
governance as an institutionalized practice of neoliberal ideology. The differences in 
the approaches Eurostat and S&P charted in the previous sections reveal that the two 
types of monitoring do not complement each other well enough to allow either for 
effective fiscal discipline or to generate consistent neoliberal pressure on policy 
making. 
To start with the latter: S&P cannot be classified as truly neoliberal and its 
interaction with Eurostat does not lead to a persistent advancement of a neoliberal 
policy agenda.. Rather than dependably pushing for coherent policy choices, it is 
transparently opportunistic in that it tries to speak to market concerns about the risk-
return prospects in sovereign credit. The concern post-crisis is low growth that can 
lead to adverse income flow and debt stock dynamics even when the fiscal headline 
figures are improving. Downgrading countries for low growth prospects is rational 
but pro-cyclical, pushing governments in difficulties into more difficulties. 
Privatization of pensions and of public assets were put on the backburner at a time 
when households are financially overstretched and financial institutions reluctant to 
invest in illiquid assets. The fact that a CRA partly anticipates and partly follows 
investor interests as they perceive them does not make it neoliberal.  
Eurostat’s independent effect on policy is not unambiguously neoliberal 
either. For example, accounting rules do not give governments a straightforward 
incentive to retrench public provisions or to privatize pensions. On the contrary, 
Eurostat’s rules make public finances look better if the government takes over 
pension liabilities from state-owned enterprises into a pay-as-you-go system in return 
for a lump-sum payment.  
The regulatory polity theory would require that European fiscal surveillance 
provide fiscal discipline that reconciles dependable rigor with the collective interests 
of member states. A supranational regulator is required to solve this collective action 
problem, namely not to overuse the common resource of a stable currency. If one 
considers this to be the prime problem of a monetary union, as the architects of the 
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euro area certainly did, then the regulatory polity theory has some evidence on its 
side. S&P’s manifest failure to exert consistent pressure for fiscal restraint on 
countries supports the view that enforcing discipline cannot be left to the markets and 
a supranational public agency is required instead.  
It is debatable, however, whether European fiscal surveillance manages to 
further collectively desirable policies while regulating budgets in this way as the 
theory requests. Eurostat’s striving for stability of rules and its ostentatious reliance 
on international expert consensus is consistent with the role of a supranational 
regulator. Yet, being bound so tightly by its own statistical rules can also come into 
conflict with policy priorities evolving during a crisis for which these rules were not 
written. Bank rescues are a case in point (Mabbett and Schelkle 2014: 15-22). Under 
Eurostat rules all measures aimed at consolidating banks affect public finances 
negatively, except for guarantees. This fiscal accounting gave European governments 
no incentives to pursue bank recapitalizations and restructuring. The revealed, if 
contingent liabilities urge governments to prioritize budget consolidation, not for fear 
of an EDP but for fear of market panic. Ireland, Italy, and Spain were in this situation. 
National banking systems then survive mainly because the ECB throws them a 
lifeline, by offering them very low refinancing in the hope that they earn higher 
returns and recapitalize themselves out of the margin
12
. However, this means that 
Eurostat’s rules contribute to perpetuating a regime that is in the short-term interest of 
national democracies but not conducive to what is officially considered good 
governance of the union.  
The observed divergence between monitoring and responses to the crisis 
shows the difficulty of a purely regulatory approach to fiscal governance. Without a 
budget that could provide incentives for compliance or fill the gaps left by member 
states, regulation by supranational bureaucracies will be imperfect even if they seek to 
enlist the help of market actors. The Commission, in the guise of Eurostat, follows a 
bureaucratic imperative of continuity, accountability and transparency, whereas 
                                                          
12
 The number of banks that are thus kept alive is much higher than the indicator of defeasance 
structures all over Europe shows. The ECB is forced to keep many banks on its list of monetary and 
financial institutions with access to the discount window. If they were declared part of defeasance 
structures, the ECB could not support them with its liquidity measures as this would fall under the 
prohibition of monetary financing of governments (Mabbett and Schelkle 2014: 19-20). 
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monitoring by CRAs is driven by market opportunism and herding behavior. Neither 
is fully justifiable on economic grounds, especially not under the circumstances of a 
crisis. They are driven by institutional logics, of an administration, on the one hand, 
and of commercial firms, on the other. This is not by mistake but an inherent trait of 
each. 
Rating agencies insist on their assessments being fundamentally different from 
regulatory purposes and now object to the regulatory role ascribed to them. This view 
is clearly expressed by the Chief Risk Officer and Chief Credit Officer at Moody’s: 
‘The growing use of ratings in regulation had given rise to three potentially adverse 
industry dynamics: (i) the substitution of regulatory demand for investor-driven 
demand for ratings, (ii) the growing perception that ratings were something more than 
an opinion as a result of their official recognition by regulators, and (iii) a vicious 
circle of intrusive regulation to induce ratings and rating agencies to behave in line 
with regulatory needs, potentially changing the nature of ratings.’ (Cantor 2013: 27) 
In an interview, a senior decision maker at S&P expressed similar reservations against 
their regulatory role. CRAs define their role as service providers to the financial 
industry, not as actors outside or beyond that industry. They stress that what they 
offer is an opinion on creditworthiness meant to help investors in their own decision-
making process rather than authoritative assessments of credit quality to be used for 
regulatory purposes. Key in this distinction is the room for qualitative, subjective 
assessment that is recognized as such.  
This emphasis on ‘opinions about creditworthiness’ might be self-serving, 
namely to limit legal liability and defending their autonomy, but it is still an insight 
that needs to be heeded by those who hope that a tightened fiscal surveillance regime 
and new rules for sovereign credit rating can do the trick for EU fiscal governance. 
New regulation on the rating business came into force on June 20, 2013, seeking to 
make it more transparent, more predictable and more accountable
13
. However, such 
                                                          
13
 The new rules mandate CRAs to set up a calendar indicating when they will rate Member States and 
to rate sovereigns at least every six months, but not more often than three times a year. They also 
stipulate that rating changes may only be announced on Fridays after close of business to allow 
governments to react to the news before markets can move. They require CRAs to make their 
methodologies public and invite comments from stakeholders. They also demand that CRAs disclose 
the assumptions that their assessment is based on. They seek to create greater accountability by making 
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rules have little chance of transforming CRA activities as desired by the regulator if 
CRAs and the regulator disagree about what rating agencies do.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
Market discipline, even if it reliably existed, is not a natural ally of prudent regulation. 
When markets become a binding constraint on government finances, they usually 
trigger a crisis that, for better or worse, nobody is prepared to simply let run its 
course. The EU approach of regulating governments into ever more transparency and 
accountability is prone to distort the lessons to be drawn from any of these financial 
crises. It always starts and ends with holding governments accountable, regardless of 
whether sovereign debt is the cause in the first place.  
This bias reveals a view of governments as potentially effective actors who 
can control their budgets if only given the right incentives. When they fail to do so, 
then it must be out of opportunism, notably to raise their reelection chances. Such a 
view cannot account for what happened to all governments in this crisis: they were 
pushed by market failure into huge deficits or at least high contingent liabilities. 
Certainly, some governments were ill-prepared for such a fiscal shock because they 
did not have their budgets under control before the crisis: Greece, the euro area’s 
weakest link, therefore broke first. Unresolved distributive conflicts in many countries 
make budgetary policy the overstretched guarantor of fragile compromises (Barta 
2011). Stabilization may therefore be delayed even if it is a negative sum game – a 
situation that Alesina and Drazen (1991) captured in the stylized notion of a war of 
attrition that fiscal authorities are too weak to end. 
For the recasting of integration and governance of EMU, our findings imply 
that there are limits to institution building. Reformers and their academic advisors 
should acknowledge that it is sometimes the vulnerability of governments and not 
their strength and activism that is the problem. Exposing them to market pressures, 
through transparency and other devices of social engineering, cannot force 
governments to do the right thing; it just shows their vulnerability. No institutional 
fixes at the EMU level can solve the distributive conflicts inside member states. This 
                                                                                                                                                                      
CRAs liable for errors caused by ‘gross negligence’.  (see: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-
555_en.htm?xrs=RebelMouse_tw accessed on December 29, 2014). 
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precludes the more maximalist solutions like a central budget for the foreseeable 
future, unless one wants to risk a political backlash reversing integration. The U.S. 
dollar union was not built in just five years (Gaspar). Hamilton’s reforms were all 
undone in the following century, including political union with the secession of 
Southern states. To this very day, a no bail-out regime for states and municipalities is 
in place that is harsher than present EMU practice.  An insolvency law for sovereign 
debtors might be a more constructive way forward, not least because it could 
discipline financial markets.    
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